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GOOD 
RELATIONS
It was Professor Joe Isaac, that most perceptive observer of the postwar Australian industrial relations scene, who once remarked: “Perfection 
in industrial relations is for the millenium”. He was 
responding to the argument that the cure for Aus­
tralia’s economic ills would be found in a detailed 
blueprint for changing its industrial relations sys­
tem—whether by deregulation of the labour mar­
ket, or, alternatively, by regulation to the hilt.
The point Isaac was making was that industrial 
relations is not an artificial construct which can be 
simplistically modelled by computer experts and 
imposed by government as part of its economic 
strategy. It is rather the rules and patterns of behav­
iour which characterise the relationship between 
employers, unions and workers, and which are 
shaped by longer term historical forces and tradi­
tions. In other words, more than anything else, 
industrial relations is who we are and what we want 
to be—as individuals, as trade union members and 
as a society.
This is not to say that government has no role to 
play in industrial relations, but it will, of necessity, 
be a modest one. What government can do, if it has 
a mandate for change in industrial relations, is 
shape the environment in which workplaces organ­
ise their activities. Both Labor and the Coalition 
agree the decentralisation of wage bargaining is 
desirable in order to create scope for companies to 
become more efficient and competitive. Moreover, 
this can be achieved in one of two ways—either by 
promoting a co-operative, ‘managed’ approach to 
change which involves unions in wage bargaining 
and the whole range of company decisions, or to opt 
for deregulation, which effectively means employer 
coercion and the exclusion of a union role for 
decision-making.
Until now, the Accord partnership with the 
union movement has been the ace which Labor has 
played again and again since 1983, with consider­
able success, to demonstrate the superiority of a co­
operative approach to labour market reform. In the 
future, however, the challenge for the Accord will 
be not only to shape but also to adapt its internal 
dynamic to the new system of decentralised bar­
gaining—and, in particular, to the expanded influ­
ence of workplace union organisation which it will 
bring in its wake. This will mean striking a new 
' balance at the workplace between the requirements 
of productivity and efficiency on the one hand and 
those of fairness and equity on the other—a balance 
found in every modem industrial relations system.
(i) The centralised system: Traditionally in Aus­
tralia the balance between efficiency and equity has 
been struck in the context of a centralised system 
which had its origin in the nexus established at 
Federation between industrial protection and com­
pulsory arbitration. At this time, tariffs for manufac­
turing enterprises were made contingent upon the 
payment of a ‘basic wage’ determined by a central 
arbitration tribunal after hearing submissions by the 
parties. Indeed, the tribunal ultimately became the 
main instrument of wages policy, effecting national 
wage increases on the basis of national productivity 
growth and cost of living adjustments, which flowed 
on to the range of award classifications according to 
the doctrine of comparative wage justice.
This approach to wages policy satisfied the 
limited domestic productivity requirements of the 
time by setting a floor price for labour, which 
encouraged investment in labour-saving technol­
ogy rather than wage undercutting, and satisfied 
equity requirements by mandating the general ap­
plication of wage increases to all sections of the 
workforce. The problem with the traditional ap­
proach was that by the late 1960s the massive 
surpluses generated by the commodities sector were 
no longer sufficient to sustain a largely inefficient 
and uncompetitive manufacturing sector, due to 
the declining terms of trade over the postwar pe­
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riod. Hence both tariff policy and wages policy were 
in line for a fundamental reassessment.
This reassessment, while accepted in part by the 
Whitlam and Fraser governments, was not acted 
upon in any coherent way until 1983, when the 
Hawke government began the process of product 
market deregulation through a series of tariff reduc­
tions, culminating in the 1991 statement, Building 
a Competitive Australia. The implications of re­
duced protection were, first, that firms and organi­
sations would have to improve theirproductivity to 
become competitive in domestic and international 
markets; and second that reforms of the labour 
market were necessary to encourage employers and 
unions to make improvements in workplace pro­
ductivity, especially through the better use of new 
technologies and skills—their priority task.
Research has since suggested that the produc­
tivity slowdown recorded in the first years of the 
Hawke government was due in some measure to the 
across-the-board wage restraint policy which, while 
contributing to rapid jobs growth, was a disincen­
tive to labour-saving investment. This policy was 
pursued initially through wage indexation and the 
insertion of‘no extra claims’ commitments in awards, 
but it came unstuck with the trade crisis of 1985/86, 
which intensified the effects of the tariff reductions • 
then under way. As we shall see, the ‘no extra 
claims’ commitment was only abandoned with the 
adoption of enterprise bargaining by the Industrial 
Relations Commission (IRC) when the focus 
switched from restraining wages growth to control 
instead over unit labour costs, which includes a 
measure of productivity.
(ii) Managed decentralisation: Surprisingly, per­
haps, there is substantial common ground in the 
debate on labour market reform which accepts that 
decentralisation of wage bargaining to the enter­
prise and workplace level will contribute to im­
provements in productivity and performance. But 
important differences remain over what kind of 
industrial relations system Australia should arm for, 
and how to get there. Even employer groups disa­
gree. Some, backed by the Coalition, favour whole­
sale deregulation of the labour market with a mini­
mal role for industrial tribunals and unions; others 
prefer Labor’s ‘managed’ transition to centralised 
bargaining within the framework of tribunal deci­
sions and the award system—and with a continuing 
emphasis on securing union co-operation.The gov­
ernment has chosen to pursue this managed ap­
proach to decentralisation in the context of its 
Accord relationship with the ACTU, which has 
proceeded through IRC National Wage Case deci­
sions in three stages:
•  First, the ‘Restructuring and Efficiency Prin­
ciple’ as part of the two-tier system made access to 
the four per cent wage increase contingent upon 
productivity trade-offs. In the main they took a 
narrow cost-cutting form.
•  Second, the ‘Structural Efficiency Principle’ 
made access to further wage increases contingent 
upon progress with award restructuring, which was 
designed to provide a new framework for workplace 
bargaining; and
•  Third, the ‘Enterprise Bargaining Principle’ 
abandoned the ‘no extra claims’ commitment alto­
gether and permitted firms to negotiate wage in­
creases of any size provided they were associated 
with measures to effect ‘real productivity gains’. 
These developments were underpinned by legisla­
tive changes—particularly si 15 of the 1988 Indus­
trial Relations Act, which created scope for ‘certi­
fied agreements’ outside the award system, and its 
subsequent replacement sl34, which also removed 
the ‘public interest’ test, requiring only that agree­
ments do not ‘disadvantage’ employees. Recent 
research based on the 1991 Australian Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS) shows that 
managed decentralisation has been successful inso­
far as it has provided scope for employers and unions 
to pursue a co-operative approach to change at the 
workplace, and that neither the award system nor 
union presence is a barrier when this approach is 
implemented in the context of appropriate strate­
gies.
In the first set of results, the AWIRS data 
indicated that in the two years following the intro­
duction of the R &. E Principle, 86% of workplaces 
had implemented at least one major restructuring 
change with 19% implementing five or more changes 
(54% for large workplaces with more than 500 
employees), and that awards were seen as a barrier 
to change in only six per cent of workplaces. In the 
second set of results, analysis of the data suggested 
that those workplaces which registered the highest 
‘intensity of collaboration’ between management 
and workforce as measured by the characteristics of 
their joint consultative arrangements also experi­
enced the best productivity outcomes according to 
a range of key performance indicators.
Significantly, analysis by the federal Depart­
ment of Industrial Relations of the first 100 workplace 
productivity agreements ratified by the IRC under 
the Enterprise Bargaining Principle tends to con­
firm these results, with most agreements going be­
yond a cost-cutting approach to encompass longer 
term dynamic efficiency gains. However, it is also 
apparent from the AWIRS survey and the slow 
take-up of agreements under the EBP and s 134 that 
many workplaces lack either an adequate bargain­
ing ‘infrastructure’ (including management au­
tonomy, a union delegate structure and a ‘single 
bargaining unit’) or even the capacity to measure 
productivity for the purpose of negotiations. In 
particular, the fact that joint consultative arrange­
ments are confined to 14% of workplaces suggests 
that management is still failing to involve workers 
and unions in the decision-making process.
(iii) The future of bargaining: What role is there,
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then, for the next Labor government in a decentral­
ised bargaining system, and what role for the IRC? 
How will the balance between efficiency and eq­
uity now be struck? Ideally, the government will 
want simultaneously to generate sustained produc­
tivity growth and a new workplace culture through 
industrial relations reform—which will require a 
continuing workplace focus with an emphasis on 
achieving international ‘best practice’—and to 
maintain fairness and comparability through a fair 
wages policy—which could potentially mark out a 
new, more stable role for the IRC.
While the government and the IRC have been 
able to provide an important catalyst for industrial 
relations reform, we can expect their role to dimin­
ish in the future as employers and unions them­
selves assume responsibility for their own workplace 
agreements. This is recognised already by the 
ACTU, whose amalgamation strategy encompasses 
a devolution of power to workplace union repre­
sentatives in the context of large, well-resourced 
industry and occupational unions. However, there 
is still an important role for the government in 
supporting the development of a viable and crea­
tive workplace bargaining ‘infrastructure’, and, in 
particular, in ensuring that workers and their union 
representatives have access to the key decisions on 
reform at all levels. Some progress has been made 
through award restructuring, but Labor’s ‘industrial 
democracy’ agenda remains largely unfulfilled.
The kind of issues embraced by industrial rela­
tions reform in the 1990s include work reorganisa­
tion and job redesign, broadbanding of job classifi­
cations, multiskilling and teamwork, flexible work­
ing time arrangements, career paths for all employ­
ees with adequate training provisions, equal oppor­
tunities for women and disadvantaged minorities, 
parental leave and access to childcare and occupa­
tional health and safety. These issues are all part of 
the expanding agenda of joint negotiation and 
agreement at the workplace, which must ultimately 
encompass the investment decisions of companies 
as well. As the Minister for Industrial Relations, 
Peter Cook, commented recently in the Financial 
Review.
With the recovery, there will be a strong profit 
surge in Australia, which is already showing up. 
We would want to see that money invested in 
Australian manufacturing in particular, but in 
Australian industry in general. And I’m pretty 
sure that one of the elements of an Accord 
debate will be unions pushing for employers to 
invest their profits back into this country. That’s 
a reasonable question to talk to employers about 
in the Accord outcome, particularly when they 
are looking at moderate wage outcomes as an 
element [of the Accord].
If workforce involvement in such decisions de­
pended on the discretion of employers, even if it
could be shown to be in their own interest, it would 
be a long time coming in Australia. What is re­
quired here is legislation, similar to that in many 
European countries, setting out workers’ rights to be 
systematically consulted and informed at the 
workplace about the whole range of company deci­
sions. An initiative by Labor in this area would 
achieve three things. First, it would release the 
talents of workers on the shop-floor and contribute 
to productivity improvement. Second, it would 
allow workers themselves to strike a balance be­
tween investment and consumption at the 
workplace, rendering formal pay limits unneces­
sary. And third, it would provide a more favourable 
political context for the passage of ‘right to strike’ 
legislation—which, on its own, has proved too hot 
for Labor to handle.
While formal pay limits are clearly incompat­
ible with a decentralised bargaining system, the 
IRC has the opportunity to reinvent itself, with the 
encouragement of the next Labor Government, by 
establishing what might be called a ‘fair wages’ 
policy. This would accompany and counter-bal­
ance the process of industrial relations reform, with 
its emphasis on productivity improvement. It would 
encompass a number of significant features, includ­
ing: the principle of comparability, which will re­
main a powerful force even in a workplace bargain­
ing environment; the ability to set minimum rates 
in awards and supplementary payments for low paid 
groups; market comparisons in public sector pay 
determination and equal pay for work of equal value 
linked to formal, agreed job evaluation procedures.
Already, in response to the Kennett govern­
ment’s labour law changes, the federal government 
has announced plans to legislate afair wages role on 
the basis of International Labour Organisation 
conventions—which would, among other things, 
give the IRC the authority for the first time to 
determine minimum rates “whether or not an inter­
state dispute exists” for employees who lack such 
protection, and to award equal pay for work of equal 
value. This proposal, should it be upheld by the 
High Court as being within the foreign affairs power 
of the Constitution, would entail a radical exten­
sion of the IRC’s power and accelerate the shift 
from a state-based system to a unified national 
system of industrial relations supervised by an inde­
pendent ‘fair wages’ tribunal.
A commitment by Labor to a fair wages policy 
would have three effects. First, it would supply the 
ingredient of fairness many perceive to be lacking in 
the recent shift to workplace productivity bargain­
ing, without losing the bargaining momentum. Sec­
ond, it would provide an important role for the IRC, 
drawing upon its ability to discriminate on the basis 
of consistent principles between fair and unfair 
differentials and relativities in the wage structure. 
And third, it would introduce a measure of stability 
into the bargaining system, which will be crucial as
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recovery gets under way and the inevitable pres­
sures build up for a community catch-up and enter- 
prise-by-enterprise wage leap-frogging. The lesson 
of wage explosions here and overseas is that govern­
ments take notice of them only when it is too late.
Industrial relations is-a policy area in which 
Labor can justifiably claim to have made consider­
able progress through its Accord with the ACTU, 
but there is still much to be done. With the shift to 
decentralised bargaining, the nature and rhetoric of 
the Accord must change from a relationship be­
tween the government and senior union officials to 
one with ordinary union members—on whom, after
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If the labour movement in general or the Left in particular wishes to be serious—and to be taken seriously—then it must accept the intellectual 
and political discipline of ensuring that its program 
is consistent with plausible (‘sustainable’) fiscal 
policy outcomes during the 1990s. In the absence of 
such discipline any proposed program will be im­
possible to implement and unlikely to receive an 
electoral mandate.
I have made reference to this before in ALR. 
After the May 1991 NSW election I mentioned 
that the “intellectual and political challenge for the 
labour movement aspiring to govern is to marry 
community-based programs with overall coherence 
in an age of economic austerity which is far from 
being over” (ALR 130). Last year, responding to the 
question “Is the Left Braindead?”, I noted that on 
the one hand “we need a growth rate of the economy 
capable of systematically reducing unemployment 
towards the ultimate goal of full employment. On 
the other hand, and at the same time, we need to 
stabilise foreign debt and [the] current account
all, the success of bargaining will ultimately de­
pend. I have argued here that the Accord should 
feature at its centre a new balance between the 
forces of efficiency and equity, which promotes 
workforce influence and involvement in industrials.
relations reform, on the one hand, and a fair wages 
policy on the other. With these twin principles of 
involvement and fairness as its watchwords, 
the Accord will continue to have a major role to 
play in building a modem social democracy in 
Australia. ■
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deficit at levels which are sustainable”. And I added 
that, “this also has definite and largely inescapable 
implications for the balance between public sector 
expenditure and revenue” (ALR 141). Let me here 
try to clarify these ideas.
The key concept behind economic debate in 
this area is “financial sustainability”—a concept 
which may be applied to both the ‘balance sheet’ for 
Australia as a whole and the balance sheet for the 
Australian public sector as a whole (not the same 
thing). The core of‘sustainability’ is that financial 
obligations be stabilised in two key respects: the 
level of net liabilities as a proportion of income 
must cease increasing (and approach a constant 
number); and the level of income transfer (mean­
ing interest, dividends, profits, rents, etc paid to 
foreigners) obligations arising from outstanding li­
abilities must also cease increasing as a proportion 
of recurrent income.
Applying this rather abstract formula to Aus­
tralia as a whole, Australia’s total liabilities to 
foreigners are the sum total of all past current
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